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Countering ISIS in Southeast Asia:  
The case for an ICT offensive
Strengthening relationships and strategic thinking across the Indo-Pacific
“We have an ongoing Islamist terror threat and the situation in Syria has the potential to escalate that threat 
as militarised radicals come back.
I don’t say that there is any simple solution to this problem, but the vigilance that’s been maintained since 
2001 needs to be increased….”
- Prime Minister Tony Abbott1
Introduction
Southeast Asia has direct experience of returning extremists. Indonesian veterans of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan laid the foundations for a spate of terrorist attacks including the Bali bombings that killed 202 
people. The same conflict drove the creation of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines as well as enduring links to Al 
Qaeda. The rise of ISIS represents the latest chapter in a war against extremism former head of the army, 
Peter Leahy, has said will likely involve Australia ‘for the rest of the century.’2 However, ISIS represents a 
particularly virulent and concerning threat.
First, with its de facto control of significant portions of Iraq and Syria ISIS is a different type of terrorist group. 
As then-US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel put it: ‘They’re [ISIS] beyond just a terrorist group. They marry 
ideology, a sophistication of strategic and tactical military prowess. They are tremendously well-funded.’3 
Second, communications technology and low cost travel have created the potential for wider and deeper 
regional connections than those formed by militants fighting in Afghanistan in the 80s. Jemaah Islamiyah and 
Abu Sayyaf fighters used links forged in Afghanistan to stay connected (one reason Jemaah Islamiyah fighters 
find sanctuary with the Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines), but returning ISIS fighters could take regional 
cooperation to new levels. Communications technologies give ISIS recruiters a messaging platform across 
the region and low cost travel is making transport to the Middle East far easier than it was in the 1980s. This 
is increasing the number of fighters stemming from the region as well as broadening the range of countries 
they are coming from. As the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict put it, ISIS is creating a potent mix: ‘The 
appeal of ISIS is different, a combination of religious prophecies involving Sham (greater Syria); the string of 
victories in Iraq in June that gave a sense of backing a winner; the resonance of the concept of the caliphate; 
and sophisticated use by ISIS of social media.’4
1 Phillip Coorey, ‘Syria war graduates bigger threat than 2001 attacks, says Abbott’, Australian Financial Review, 10 June 2014, http://
www.afr.com/p/national/syria_war_graduates_bigger_threat_2hwUer2QZMX4xjPtjdusjM 
2	 Brendan	Nicholson,	‘We’ll	fight	radical	Islam	for	100	years,	says	ex-army	head	Peter	Leahy’,	The Australian, 9 August 2014, http://
www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/well-fight-radical-islam-for-100-years-says-exarmy-head-peter-leahy/story-
e6frg8yo-1227018630297 
3	 Chuck	Hagel,	‘News	transcript’,	US	Department	of	Defence,	21	August	2014, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=5491 
4	 ‘The	evolution	of	ISIS	in	Indonesia,’	IPAC	Report	13,	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 24 September 2014, p 2,  
http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf 
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Third, unlike the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a direct participant in the conflict (Australia) is located in the 
immediate region, making it an enduring focus for returning extremists. 
Steps are being taken to shape the military outcome in Iraq and Syria. Increasingly vigorous legal, policing 
and intelligence efforts are also being made to prevent the departure of more would-be-militants and 
manage their ongoing presence in the region as well as the return of trained extremists. However, the non-
government sector also has much to offer in terms of understanding how ISIS is exploiting technology and 
communications, and turning these tools against them to discredit its appeal. 
This report looks at the scale of the problem, its regional nature, the threat to Australia and the nature of the 
response so far. It concludes with an integrated, regional proposal to undermine the appeal of ISIS to would 
be-militants, and those who are already radicalized using the same tools ISIS is currently exploiting to its own 
advantage.
The scale of the problem
In September 2014, a CIA source reported the number of foreign fighters in Syria alone at more than 15,000, 
including 2,000 Westerners. These came from over 80 countries.5 In Australia’s immediate region four 
countries are the largest sending states: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Other countries of 
interest include Singapore, Thailand and Brunei.
The estimates of ISIS fighters originating from Australia and Southeast Asia vary. Foreign Minister Julie 
Bishop has said 150 Australians have been or are currently fighting with extremists in Iraq and Syria,6 leading 
Time to dub Australia ‘the biggest per capita contributor of foreign jihadists to ISIS’.7 
In April 2013, the Director General of ASIO, David Irvine, said the numbers of Australians fighting with the 
rebels in Syria was ‘in the hundreds and not the tens’.8
The estimated number of ISIS fighters stemming from Indonesia varies from 34 to 300. In August 2014, 
Ansyaad Mbai, the head of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) said he had the names of 34 Indonesian 
ISIS members. In a September 2014 report, the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict stated ‘the true figure is 
probably over a hundred, though estimates in the Australian media of over 300 are almost certainly too high.’9
In the Philippines, two militant Islamic groups have pledged their support to ISIS: the Bangsamoro Islamic 
Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Abu Sayyaf.10 A Reuters report from September 2014 discussed the deaths of 
two Filipino Muslims who died in the Syria conflict in March and noted ‘about 100 Filipinos traveled to Iran 
to undergo military training and were subsequently deployed in Syria’ according to the Foreign Ministry.11 
This followed a conflicting statement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines the previous month that no 
Filipinos had been identified training or joining ISIS in Iraq or Syria.12 
In Malaysia, one report in September 2014 citing a senior Malaysian intelligence official said 40 Malaysians 
had been recruited, up from 30 reported by the New Straits Times in June.13 
5	 Jomana	Karadsheh,	Jim	Sciutto	and	Laura	Smith-Spark,	‘How	foreign	fighters	are	swelling	ISIS	ranks	in	startling	numbers’,	CNN, 14 
September 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/12/world/meast/isis-numbers/ 
6	 Latika	Bourke,	‘Number	of	Australians	fighting	with	militants	in	Iraq	and	Syria	‘extraordinary’,	Julie	Bishop	says’,	ABC, 19 June 2014, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-19/150-australians-fighting-with-extremists-in-iraq-and-syria/5535018 
7	 P	Nash	Jenkins,	‘You’ll	never	guess	which	country	is	the	biggest	per	capita	contributor	of	foreign	jihadists	to	ISIS’,	Time, 23 June 
2014, http://time.com/2911040/australia-isis-syria-iraq-terrorism/  
8 Brendan Nicholson, ‘Fears Aussies will turn to terror’, The Australian, 16 April, 2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/
defence/fears-aussies-will-turn-to-terror/story-e6frg8yo-1226621106177 
9	 ‘The	evolution	of	ISIS	in	Indonesia,’	IPAC	Report	13,	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 24 September 2014, p 19, http://file.
understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf  
10	 	‘Philippine	jihadists	pledge	support	to	Islamic	State’,	RT, 16 August 2014, http://rt.com/news/180736-philippine-jihadists-support-isis/ 
11	 Manuel	Mogato,	‘Philippines	starts	inquiry	into	Filipino	militants	in	Syria’,	Reuters, 13 September 2014, http://mobile.reuters.com/
article/idUSKBN0H804R20140913?irpc=932  
12	 ‘AFP:	no	Filipinos	fighting	with	ISIS’,	Philippine Times, 21 August 2014, http://www.philippinetimes.com/index.php/sid/224948579 
13	 ‘Malay-speaking	Isis	fighters	come	together	under	new	unit,	report	says’,	Malaysian Insider, 26 September 2014, http://www.
themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malay-speaking-isis-fighters-come-together-under-new-unit-report-says and Hariz Mohd and 
Rahmat	Khairulrijal,	‘More	locals	joining	militant	groups’, New Straits Times, 16 June 2014, http://www.nst.com.my/node/3181 
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Other Southeast Asian countries are also affected by the ISIS threat. In October 2014, Singapore’s Deputy 
Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean said:
“…our	assessment	remains	that	the	expansion	of	the	ISIL	threat	beyond	Syria	and	Iraq	has	raised	the	threat	
not	only	to	countries	who	are	part	of	the	US	coalition	but	also	to	Singapore.	As	with	the	threat	from	the	Al-
Qaeda,	even	if	Singapore	is	not	itself	a	target,	foreign	interests	here	may	be	targeted.”14
In a June 2014 ISIS video, it was claimed a recruit had even come from Cambodia.15 Thailand’s restive south is 
another potential source as perhaps is Brunei. 
A regional challenge
While there are only a few hundred citizens from across Southeast Asia and Australia fighting with ISIS, as the 
experience in Indonesia has shown, even a small number of trained and motivated former militants can leave 
a devastating terrorism legacy.
A national terror network can be difficult enough to combat, but a regionally organized grouping presents 
even greater challenges. Yet, the appeal of ISIS across the region coupled with new technology to connect 
extremists is laying the groundwork for this very network. 
As the Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister’s comments above make clear; in an interconnected region it 
is not even necessary for militants to be home grown. If a country offers attractive soft targets to strike at 
Westerners an attack is a possibility. 
The network will also extend well beyond the region. Malaysian Defence Forces Chief, General Tan Sri Zulkifeli 
Mohd Zin, said he was ‘worried that when they [militants] return to Malaysia, they will do something that can 
threaten the safety of the country, especially after they established a network in neighbouring countries from 
Syria or Iraq’.16 Another extra-regional dimension emerged in September 2014, when Indonesia arrested four 
ISIS-linked Uighurs suspected of travelling to Indonesia with the intent of engaging with local groups. They 
had reportedly travelled through Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia.17 
Technology is already playing an important connecting role among militants. Evidence has emerged of 
Indonesian and Malaysian militants connecting over Facebook.18 Facebook is also being used in a range 
of recruitment initiatives19 and social networking tools are being used by militants to communicate their 
activities in Iraq and Syria and to issue calls to action.20
Language is another uniting factor. The generally limited fluency in English or Arabic of Indonesians is 
tying them naturally to their Malaysian neighbours on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria. In August 2014, 22 
Indonesians and Malaysians came together in Al-Shadadi, Hasaka province to discuss the desirability of 
forming a katibah, a military unit of about 100 people, even posting a photo of one meeting on Facebook. 
According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, which reported the gathering, this ‘also made sense 
given the ISIS agenda to expand the reach of the caliphate to other areas, including Southeast Asia. Members 
of the katibah could become the vanguard for a fighting force that would reach into Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines.’21 
14	 ‘Parliament:	Singaporeans	planning	to	support	or	join	ISIS	will	be	dealt	with	under	the	law’,	Straits Times, 7 October 2014,  
http://www.straitstimes.com/news/singapore/more-singapore-stories/story/parliament-singaporeans-planning-support-or-join-isis-
wi#sthash.PWiFnND3.dpuf 
15	 ‘Abu	Muthanna	al-Yemeni	from	Britain	-	ISIS	‘No	life	without	jihad’	video’LiveLeak, 12 June 2014, http://www.liveleak.com/
view?i=6a5_1403639105 
16	 ‘Malay-speaking	Isis	fighters	come	together	under	new	unit,	report	says’,	Malaysian Insider, 26 September 2014, http://www.
themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malay-speaking-isis-fighters-come-together-under-new-unit-report-says 
17	 ‘Jakarta	nabs	4	foreigners	with	‘ISIS	connection’’,	Straits Times, 15 September 2014, http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-
report/indonesia/story/jakarta-nabs-4-foreigners-isis-connection-20140915 
18	 ‘The	evolution	of	ISIS	in	Indonesia,’	IPAC	Report	13,	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 24 September 2014, p 19, http://file.
understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf  
19	 Hariz	Mohd	and	Rahmat	Khairulrijal,	‘More	locals	joining	militant	groups’,	New Straits Times, 16 June 2014, http://www.nst.com.my/
node/3181
20	 Lee	Shi-Ian,	‘Malaysian	militants	for	Isis	recruited	through	social	media,	says	source’,	Malaysian Insider, 22 September 2014, http://
www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malaysian-militants-for-isis-recruited-through-social-media-says-source  
21	 ‘The	evolution	of	ISIS	in	Indonesia,’	IPAC	Report	13,	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 24 September 2014, p 19, http://file.
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Highlighting the connection between technology and regionalisation, in July, an Australian national was 
arrested in the central Philippines for allegedly using social media to recruit Filipino Muslims to join ISIS.22 
Australian and Filipino police jointly conducted the arrest. 
Other regional linkages include evidence of Indonesians seeking to join ISIS leaving from Malaysia to throw off 
surveillance and Malaysians doing the same via Indonesia. There are also links between Malaysian militants 
and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.23
Threat to Australia
The threat to Australia comes in many forms. 
There is the immediate threat posed by domestic attacks, inspired by ISIS. The most immediate example is 
the hostage taking by lone gunman Man Haron Monis in December 2014 at a Sydney café that resulted in the 
deaths of two people as well as Monis himself. 
The Monis attack followed a foiled plot to kidnap and behead a random person and a knife attack by a terror 
suspect called in by police for questioning.24 The October 2014, shooting and car attacks in Canada were in 
a similar vein: carried out by individuals who had had their passports suspended and were being monitored, 
but carried out attacks at home instead. Professor Greg Barton of Monash University was reported as saying 
a ‘new type of case management’ is needed for those who have been prevented from joining ISIS. ‘It shouldn’t 
all just fall back on police and intelligence.’25
Trained former combatants could also increase the scale and deadliness of attacks. As the Australian Financial 
Review reported in June 2014, ‘One senior source said the predominant fear was radicals returning home 
with “skills”’ honed in Syria’s civil war that would enable them to carry out military-style operations similar 
to the 2008 Mumbai massacre in India in which 166 people were murdered. ‘“They are getting more advanced 
training, bomb making, combat,” he said. “There’s a growing sense of concern.”’26 
As previous terror attacks in Indonesia have demonstrated, Australians can also be caught up or targeted in 
regional attacks. With ISIS, there is a similar risk that returning militants with newfound military skills will 
increase the deadliness of attacks abroad. As the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict observed: 
“Support	for	the	Islamic	State	(IS,	formerly	known	as	ISIS)	in	Indonesia	raises	the	risk	of	violence	there	even	
though	the	capacity	of	violent	extremist	groups	remains	low.	This	could	change	with	the	eventual	return	
home	of	Indonesians	now	fighting	in	Syria	and	Iraq	who	will	have	the	training,	combat	experience,	and	
leadership	potential	now	lacking	in	Indonesia’s	extremist	community.
The	22	September	2014	exhortation	by	IS	spokesman	Al-Adnani	to	kill	foreigners	linked	to	the	U.S.-led	
coalition	could	also	provide	an	incentive	to	Indonesian	ISIS	supporters	to	target	Westerners	as	a	way	of	
earning	approval	from	leaders	of	the	self-declared	caliphate.”27
understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf  
22	 ‘Philippines	arrests	Australian	over	ties	to	militant	group	ISIL’,	Reuters, 12 July 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/12/uk-
syria-crisis-philippines-idUKKBN0FG0PF20140712 
23 ‘Malaysia detains 14 suspected Muslim militants’, AP, 15 October 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/malaysia-detains-13-suspected-
muslim-militants-061811200.html and	‘Malay-speaking	Isis	fighters	come	together	under	new	unit,	report	says’,	Malaysian Insider, 26 
September 2014, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malay-speaking-isis-fighters-come-together-under-new-unit-
report-says 
24	 Rob	Taylor,	‘Australia	foils	alleged	beheading	plot	linked	to	Islamic	State’,	Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2014, http://online.wsj.
com/articles/australia-detains-suspects-in-terrorism-probe-1411008044	and	‘Terror	suspect	killed	after	stabbing	police’,	Sky News, 24 
September 2014, http://www.skynews.com.au/news/top-stories/2014/09/24/terror-suspect-killed-after-police-stabbed.html 
25	 Tom	Allard,	‘Canadian	shooting	an	example	of	Australian	security	agencies’	‘worst	nightmare’’,	Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 
2014, http://www.smh.com.au/national/canadian-shooting-an-example-of-australian-security-agencies-worst-nightmare-20141023-
11asc9.html#ixzz3GxjyFGfw 
26 Phillip Coorey, ‘Australia, Indonesia to share intel on Syria’, AFR, 7 June 2014, http://www.afr.com/p/national/australia_indonesia_to_
share_intel_5WA13BCRQtoTp3fS1RoU0K
27	 ‘The	evolution	of	ISIS	in	Indonesia,’	IPAC	Report	13,	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 24 September 2014, p 1, http://file.
understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf  
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Another risk comes from new regional networks developing with a common ideology and ambition. The vision 
of a caliphate promulgated by ISIS and its apparent attractiveness to small groups of extremists across the 
region, offers the potential for a new broader rallying point. The ease of connecting otherwise geographically 
isolated groups through technology could further promote this. Technology could also play an important role 
in recruitment and radicalisation around regionally focused objectives.  
There are limits to this, with language barriers the strongest. Cultural and nationalist tensions are also likely 
to be inhibitors to collaboration. There are further questions around how long a regional viewpoint can last, 
once ISIS begins to flag in Iraq and Syria.
While the scale of threat needs to be kept in proportion, there is clearly a need for sustained, long term 
vigilance.
The response
The most visible efforts from regional states to counter the ISIS threat are in the areas of law, policing and 
intelligence. 
In September 2014, Australia conducted its biggest ever anti-terrorism raids involving 800 police, in response 
to a plot linked to ISIS.28 Additional raids followed in December 2014.29 It has also canceled passports of 
citizens seeking to join the fight and of those trying to return to Australia.30 In 2013-14, it issued adverse 
security assessments in relation to 45 passports, up from 18 the previous year.31 Malaysian and Indonesian 
police have also made a string of arrests.32 
At a regional level cooperation is already beginning to occur, as the abovementioned arrest of the Australian 
national in the Philippines attests. Australia and Indonesia have also discussed intelligence sharing 
arrangements in relation to ISIS fighters.33 
The legal framework for countering the threat is still a work in progress in all countries and is complicated by 
the multifaceted and evolving nature of the threat. It needs to cover recruitment and incitement, the departure 
of would-be fighters and the suspension of their passports. The transit of militant non-nationals through a 
country’s territory, returned fighters who have fought overseas, communications by militants from prisons to 
list only a selection. 
Even in the most developed jurisdiction in the region, Australia, a raft of new anti-terror laws targeting ISIS 
fighters has only recently been passed with more to follow.34 In Indonesia, a special security meeting declared 
ISIS contrary to Pancasila, the founding philosophy of the state and an all-of-government effort to counter 
it in Indonesia, but as the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict observed ‘It was not clear what law would 
be used.’ In September the President issued a seven-point instruction for countering ISIS, but left it to his 
successor to try and pass a new bill through parliament.35
While these government led efforts are critical, what is missing is a coordinated regional effort to counter the 
tool ISIS is currently exploiting most effectively: communications technology. 
28	 ‘Authorities	thwart	‘beheading’	plot	in	Australia’s	biggest	ever	counter-terrorism	raids’,	ABC, 18 September 2014, http://www.abc.net.
au/news/2014-09-18/authorities-thwart-beheading-plot-in-australias-biggest-raid/5754276 
29	 Dan	Box,	‘Police	launch	new	terror	raids’,	The Australian, 19 December 2014.
30	 Lisa	Cox,	‘Passports	of	Australian	jihadists	cancelled,	says	Julie	Bishop’,	Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 2014, http://www.smh.com.
au/federal-politics/political-news/passports-of-australian-jihadists-cancelled-says-julie-bishop-20140622-3aly1.html#ixzz3GN0apo78 
31	 ‘ASIO	report	to	parliament	2013-2014’,	ASIO,	p	xiii,	http://www.asio.gov.au/img/files/2013-14-Report_to_Parliament.pdf 
32	 ‘Malay-speaking	Isis	fighters	come	together	under	new	unit,	report	says’,	Malaysian Insider, 26 September 2014, http://www.
themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malay-speaking-isis-fighters-come-together-under-new-unit-report-says	and	Maeswara	
Palupi,	‘Indonesia	exposing	ISIS	ties	with	local	terror	groups’, Khabar, 3 September 2014, http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB/
articles/apwi/articles/features/2014/09/03/feature-02 and	‘The	evolution	of	ISIS	in	Indonesia,’	IPAC	Report	13,	Institute for Policy 
Analysis of Conflict,	24	September	2014,	pp	18-19,	http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf  
33 Phillip Coorey, ‘Australia, Indonesia to share intel on Syria’, AFR, 7 June 2014, http://www.afr.com/p/national/australia_indonesia_to_
share_intel_5WA13BCRQtoTp3fS1RoU0K 
34	 	David	Wroe,	‘Pass	terrorism	laws	quickly,	expert	says’,	Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/political-news/pass-terrorism-laws-quickly-expert-says-20141016-1177go.html	and	‘Counter-terror	laws	pass	through	
Parliament with bipartisan support’, PM, 1 October 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2014/s4098537.htm 
35	 	‘The	evolution	of	ISIS	in	Indonesia,’	IPAC	Report	13,	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict,	24	September	2014,	pp	20-21,	http://file.
understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf  
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Fighting fire with fire
‘What	we	are	seeing	every	day,	is	new	exhortations	on	the	internet	urging	fanatics	to	murder	everyone	and	
anyone	who	acts	or	thinks	differently	from	them’.36
-Prime Minister Tony Abbott
ISIS has shown a new level of sophistication in its harnessing of communications technology to recruit 
fighters and organize them internationally. There is an urgent need for a regional response that uses the 
same tools to discredit the ISIS message and that complements existing government led efforts. Below is 
a proposal for an integrated response that targets would-be recruits, those who have been prevented from 
traveling to Iraq and Syria as well as returning militants.
Understanding and monitoring the evolving ways technology is being harnessed by ISIS is critical to 
countering the threat it poses. Technology is facilitating ISIS recruitment and organizing and will likely play a 
pivotal connecting role as militants begin returning. 
The non-government sector, particularly the technology industry, could be harnessed to blunt the 
effectiveness of ISIS’s use of technology, perhaps mobilised around a government-sponsored hub for counter-
radical communications. This would provide new and alternative sources of analysis to government on 
evolving trends and identify ways technology can be harnessed to counter the threat.
These efforts could include identification of opportunities to undermine ISIS online and testing techniques to 
counter radical online communications. These could draw on existing efforts by the Digital Outreach Team 
located within the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications at the US State Department 
that has been working on these issues since 2006 as well as various military units working on counter 
radicalization online.37 
Communications are clearly central to recruiting ISIS fighters in the first place and will play a role in 
mobilising radicals once they return. 
An empirically driven online and offline communications response that seeks to discredit the appeal of ISIS 
propaganda among vulnerable populations in Australia and Southeast Asia will be key to countering the 
threat.  
This could take several forms and would need to draw heavily on private sector expertise, including survey 
and public relations firms. Nationally representative opinion polling could be used to identify vulnerable 
communities in the four largest source states: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. For 
example, a 2012 Lowy Institute Poll in Indonesia found 12% of Indonesians are in favour of the Indonesian 
government ‘encouraging militant groups to attack Australia’. And of this 12% holding an extremist viewpoint, 
71% are under 40 and come from West Java or neighbouring Banten Province (63%), with most (58%) saying 
they speak Sundanese at home.38 This sort of polling allows for a clear targeting of campaigns among the 
most vulnerable populations.
Focused polling could be used to test the efficacy of various messages in blunting the appeal of ISIS 
propaganda. Successful messages could then be rolled out using a variety of online and offline channels 
targeting the key population groups. With follow-up polling used to measure their effectiveness and the 
opportunity for scaling. 
Cultural and religious sensitivities in the region place limitations on Australian leadership, particularly 
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Australia’s understated and softly spoken cooperation with Indonesia 
in the wake of the Bali bombings is a good example of how to do it well. Efforts to counter ISIS’s use of 
communications technologies should follow this low-key and cooperative model. Compared to military 
intervention, a low key online and offline communications offensive would be a small cost, but key to 
mitigating the threat posed by this small group of extremists across the region.
36	 	Tony	Abbott,	cited	in	‘John	Kerin,	‘Aussie	jihadist	believed	killed’,	Australian Financial Review, 30 October 2014.
37	 	Fergus	Hanson,	‘Revolution	@State:	the	spread	of	ediplomacy’,	Lowy Institute, March 2012, p 18.
38	 	Fergus	Hanson,	‘Lowy	Institute	Indonesia	poll	2012:	shattering	stereotypes’, Lowy Institute, 2012, p 11, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/
files/lowy_indonesia_poll_2012.pdf 
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